

CRISIS STUDY

(Bureaucratic Politics Conf) BPM
RAND, JULY 1970
Mansfield

'70

- Threat of resignation
- Letters, petitions.
- Explain: clear "bundles of the rules," and consequences.
- Mansfield: (form of — exhibit): "I trust Pres. —"



Re: Stuart:

Need for faint example:

- She (angry at UK's delay - challenging him
to act)

-

Need for crisis : JFK, to offer 50-50, or Polaris p. 125

b. 129 : [Ambiguity of : (a) l-r predictions

(b) Alliance / enemy motives, intentions.

Sho,

Tendency of Senior Players to rely on his own judgment.]

[Note: Broken - minor image missing;
plans in still. ests.]

Mustalt:

Leary

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Reasons for not analyzing, questioning, telling:

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Negative Value of info

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Lesson for Policy
of Rumsfeld, Halperin, et al

1. Be uncertain

(a) of nature of self, enemy (N)

(b) esp. of prediction that relies on
change in org., SOP, etc. (Rumsfeld)

2. Never, act to reduce uncertainty (ask questions...)
or hedge predictions & actions.

3. Need to change "starch images" of your
function: "theirs" & ours.

4. Beware intuition when ability to reduce
uncertainty is low. B. 1996

5. Depending (on US) reduces US need & tendency to
learn about Oth. [Baydikian] But...

Examples to study

1. Allium pol. in VN.

[Need to change power-context, participation:

e.g. (1) Congress - Exec

(2) Pentagon - Others

(3) Cold Warriors (who? why?) - Others

20 pgs 70 Conf. on Bureaucracy

RAND

[1. Why the delay in producing models like those discussed here? Why the persistence of "RDM" model in predicting Oth + US? How does this serve Power System?

Hyp: To question this for Oth is to focus attention on real process in US — and perhaps to change it.

[and expose, less, it subject it to criticism, winds]

[e.g. does SA method inevitably serve

(a) Central authority;

(b) Certain agencies, at a particular time

(e.g. the excluded agency, the underdog, the less-powerful?)

2. Implications for inference from available records : memos, NIS's, NSAM's, public statements...

e.g. Implication : Statements are oblique, insincere, loosely-coupled to "real" actions, arguments.

3. [Goal of conference : (1) Change - stand images of process, of entrants into process:

- training of Presidents
- of Congress?
- of Press?

Question: How do people learn the rules?

What happens to them when they use
one maneuver or not use ~~the~~ other?

[2. What happens to the US?]

Congress + Public

1. Senior members of Congress are as involved as the state — at highest level. Little known about this.

2. Pres. perception of public opinion, likewise, greatly affects his notion of what options are acceptable, feasible.

3. Anticipated Congress response greatly influences Pres + Cabinet. (Newspapers...)

[Halperin: this kept Pres/Dallas from ever making the flat statement that they would defend Quemoy.

[Note: Quemoy = Cambodia : "



"If defense is necessary to:
VINZ

lives of Americans

4. What access of Congressmen to various actors

next: Models II + III should be used
together, as in his Taimu study:
look at both individuals + eggs.

Lies,

Halperin:

Dulles thought from the start that GRC was faking; but would not admit this in meeting with Pentagon; so 500 spent the great effort trying to convince Dulles of this.

[Why not?

Halperin

(Why does Plager not generalize from his perception of his own org to

(2) other orgs in system

(b) other countries?

Why does this "knowledge" of orgs remain tacit, esoteric?

(3) What are consequences of Mott's Propositions being tacit, esoteric, unfamiliar?

(b) Why this state of affairs?

Moore:

If we ask, Why does our foreign policy come out the way it does? Answer is: domestic politics dominates. ("Ever since the fall of China") the powerful actor...

If we ask, Why does Executive act the way it does, or How does it act

Halperin: Most important ~~reason~~ thing to say about reasons for VN: Pres didn't want to lose Indochina the way we lost China

& "Rusk having lost China, didn't want to lose Indochina [esp: esp. after 1961]"

Burlington Politics
Conference, 20 Aug 70

Model III

Allison: Without McN, Johnson + RFK,
there would have been an air strike;
With an air strike, "I think there would
have been a 30% chance of nuclear war."
"I've never heard an estimate of less than
10% — from anyone who has seriously
studied the problem."

(Hsr: "!"

DE: "!"

DE: The bureaucratic process models are wrong
as adequate explanations ^{of foreign policy + behaviour,} (all major
variables, actors, relations, etc.) ; they over-emphasize
role of internal factors + perceptions of them ;
(see Holpin, p.4 of book)

DE



(WJ is Pres a great "inventor" of options
(combines, deletes)

Process models: suggest important perceptions are of other
actors internal to the system

neglect:

- 1) role of certain type of personnel congresses ; domestic pol.,
"history"
 - 2) role of Pres, appointees
 - 3) role of external actors ; Congress, press, interests
- Solutions: (1) Report bureaucratic models
(1) limit aim: to bureaucratic factors ; (2) bring in pol. factors,
actors, Pres.
← (define interfere)
(3) explain how pol. factor enter.

hsc : Effect of time-constraints i.e.g.

routines are constraining - crisis

[Why do crises arise?

Why do decisions wait till crises?]

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What

(Rosenzweig): Bureaucratic factors make outcome less control

1. Recognize ~~ignorance~~ / uncertainty (complexity + ignorance)
Possibly irreducible ignorance. Distinct "negotially" strategies.
2. Expect lying.
3. Expect resistance
4. Always ask: Why did he say that? and don't trust intuition, or other, answers; but presume tentatively.
5. (Holperin)
Bureaucracy: is playing long-run bureaucratic game
Pres (Cabinet): is playing short-run political & bureaucratic game.
6. Adapt to uncertainty: (a) look at history; (b) look for bureaucracy; (c) test; (d) hedge

As in May Prop. 3:

(Holbrooke's African Desk on Biafra

protected Trueman from concluding with of
genocide in Biafra ; WH was suspicious, but...)

as seen from White House

Lagos (Trueman) apparently made decision
that to press Gowon on saving lives, 4 weeks
before collapse to 2 weeks after

[To change image of process — as Neustadt wants —
would cause D to challenge some "sacred
(not, "shared") images, " (a) pulling himself out of
court; (b) failing to communicate.

("Will Chivers really....?")

Will have by ICBM's (1961)....?)

and challenge current power structure, policy.

(Reasons: Why are particular models held....)

If new Model led to "new questions by
Pres...." — that would affect power, policy,
"credibility of Pres...."

It would challenge "sacred predictions

("sacred images")

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x

On May prop. 3:

(Hollander): Desk officer is lower in rank than Ambassador; his career depends ^{in part} on goodwill of that Ambassador. Don't rely on that subordinate (if you're AS/FE, or be state) to alert you to his by the Ambassador.

Of Westy's reasons for lying about ARVN; not challenged by JCS, or mil. rps in ISA; (Westy became Chief of Staff).



bst: In domestic side of gov, no requirement to put everything in terms of Model I; open reference to role of interest groups.

In national security area, departures from Model I [for US or other] are common, illegitimate, or not thought of.

Neustadt: this split dates from WWII; before that, except for State, few thought of "national interest," in ~~domestic~~ foreign policy, which was seen as resultant of 'special interests'.

Waltz: Model I works better if you enlarge the objection function

[yes: to the extent that system reflects Presidential will (or a single dominant agency)].

[Is US foreign policy usefully described as 'purposive,' or as a homeostatic system, but one that serves no one person's or (or groups) aims/preferences.

Model I: (2) Unitary preference map.

(1) "rational interest," explicit,
impersonal objectives.

Dist. from ^{SVN} IVA: Unitary preference map;
Political/bureaucratic/rational
aims
(non-Q.S.)

^{SVN} IVB: + bureaucratic factors.

(important but secondary:

"Conspiracy + ^{to run every} Quicksand

(Hallwack: key judgment was made by CBJ
before office: He would not lose a
country to Communism.


"Rusk will prove to have been the
second most important man in VN; his role
was hidden, but he had a clear, determined,
consistent objective..."

(Quicksand: either cognitive failings, or
Models II or III.

(DE: "Rough outlines of IV evolution would have been the same if whole USG were a faithful (though imperfect) staff to the Pres, then only loyalty."
(perhaps even if foresight had been better.)

IVB would be better : ^{uniting} Politics & Quicksand.

This would be better than Model II or III
excluding Pres, or excluding politics.



Model I

Hall: Most / Pres think that
the way to explain foreign policy is that
bureaucrats work to influence Pres &
the policy and the President responds
to the bureaucracy.

We say: the Pres is at the center of
two circles / systems; outside factors/
actors work directly on the President,
not just through

Hall:

Hoopes shows ~~the~~ bureaucrats "battling for
the President's mind"

Bureaucrats think that "Pres' policy"
is the result of their activities.

Hall: In policy formulation, role of Pres is
underestimated by BPM.

In implementation, Models II-III have greater
impact. [see Halpin on USAF implementation
of March 31 guidelines].

[Presidents underestimate this.]

[They learn, gradually, but always have surprises ahead; never know brokers ahead.

They always think

(a) range of behaviors is broader than it is;

(b) their control is greater than it is.

DE: REN Pres Power clearly implies that
"if of bureaucracy would do what Pres
wants...."

Hall: Aron is: "What's good for the President is
good for the country."

Hallmont: Pres. should have more control than
he does; ^{there} should be for more political
appointees, in State, CIA, ...

Kevin: I agree: in democracy...

But, Congress & Judiciary...

Hall: But will that really increase Pres control?
Look at middle-level non-careerists...

(Hypo; the ^{decision} formulation, role of decreasing vs.
Pres is less than here, or M-A think;
(for major decisions)

In implementation, this role is greater than
Pres realises (or, outside).

Roles are issue-specific; for front-page
items, Pres + "non-careenists" play non role;
for back-page or non-items, ...

Tom's data

"The amount of attention a high-level official
gives a problem is directly related to the
probability the item will get on the front pages."

Doornik: Type III info is hard to get, because

- (a) individuals need secrets (alliances; secret info;
what your personal view is;
when your loyalties lie.
- (b) changeable

"You gotta look open-minded to
be effective."

Also: When others know how you will come out on a problem,
you are no longer an object of bargaining, persuasion, ...

Monster

"You can't express pessimism in a large
mating, because you will be suspected of
wishing the failure to occur: "a psychological
addiction to failure" (Agnew) [Some will work
against goal, ~~and~~ or will not work for it.]

[or... wanting to "do nothing"]

[Wander showed his hand:

but his target was McN, the Clifford;
didn't try to safeguard "effectiveness" beyond
a certain point; went all-out...

[x/y]:

["Some actors in Experience — esp. Pres — are influenced by actions and expectations of actions of: voters, Parties, press, interest groups, Congress." — as well as actions of bureaucrats, & his own attitudes, aims.

✓ Pres Motives:

(1) A legislative / Admin program — which competes with security aims

(2) Others, his broad aims for the country;

(2) His aims for the world (peace, arms control)

(3) How he will look to history. (LBJ obsession, recording)